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Prospects of the EU’s Common Foreign and 
Security Policy and Russia’s Disinformation 
Campaign in the South Caucasus
Abstract
This paper aims to provide an empirical analysis of EU policy towards 
the South Caucasus in the framework of the CFSP and CSDP along with 
perspectives of further development, taking in to consideration Russia’s 
military and ideological intervention in this region, and to address the 
issue of the EU’s role in shaping Common European Security. Methodo-
logically, the research is based on qualitative techniques of analysis, key 
assumptions are raised through a comprehensive review of existing stud-
ies/primary sources and, more specifi cally, presents a case study of August 
2008’s Georgia–Russia military confrontation and creeping occupation. 
The comprehensive review continues with Russia’s disinformation cam-
paign and series of anti-government protests in Georgia (after the so-called 
“Gavrilov’s Night”), testing several theoretical explanations such as the 
democratic peace theory and the Europeanization Confl ict concept con-
cerning the EU’s confl ict resolution instruments’ evaluation and offensive 
realism to explain Russia’s involvement/intervention in South Caucasus 
territorial confl icts. As for its structure, the paper includes an introduc-
tion, with two important stages of model building – conceptualization and 
operationalization, an interpretation part – an overview of EU Foreign 
and Security Policy instruments, relationships with other global/regional 
actors, confl icts in the South Caucasus, specifi cally the, Georgia case, and, 
fi nally, a summarizing part, where key fi ndings are highlighted.
Keywords: Post-Soviet Territorial Confl icts, Russia’s Disinformation 
Campaign, European Union Common Foreign and Security Policy
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Introduction
More than 25 years after the collapse of Soviet Union, South Caucasus 
countries are facing a transitional dilemma, which, with a variety of social-
economical and political challenges, is expressed in territorial confl icts, 
encouraged through Russia’s intervention. In 1991, newly independent 
former Soviet Union countries were drawn in ethnic/territorial confl icts. 
Russia encouraged and supported South Ossetia and Abkhazia’s separatist 
forces’ military confrontation against the legitimate government of Geor-
gia (as the country did consequently in 1991–1992, 1992–1993, and 2008) 
beyond the facade of the nation’s self-determination. In August 2008, a fi ve 
day war between Russia and Georgia questioned post-Cold War security 
order between the West and Russia. The 2008 war marked an important 
evolution in the series of confl icts that started in the Caucasus in tandem 
with the weakening and collapse of the Soviet Union. While in the late 
1980s and early 1990s the confl icts were the result of mass mobilization 
around the banner of the nation (marking a revolutionary period of para-
digm shifts) the 2008 war was much closer to classical wars between states 
and their centrally commanded armies. The attention of world leaders and 
the public was focused on Beijing on 8th August 2008, to witness the open-
ing of the 29th Olympic Games, broadcast across the world as the new power 
of an old empire. The programmes were interrupted, and news fl ashes fol-
lowed about a war erupting in the far away Caucasus. The Caucasus briefl y 
captured global attention as a new confl ict erupted in Georgia.1
Existing studies show that while the EU has developed a coherent eco-
nomic policy with South Caucasus countries especially in the transport sec-
tor, paradoxically, it has had no corresponding coherent confl ict resolution 
policy for this region. The European Union eventually added mediation to 
its policy during the Russia–Georgia armed confl ict in 2008, but Member 
States of the EU still found it hard to facilitate a political solution during 
the Geneva Process and a creeping occupation of Georgian territories by 
Russian military forces is still ongoing at the time of this writing.
Concerning the position of other European institutions, it should be 
mentioned that on June 25th, 2019 the parliament of the Council of Eu-
rope in a decision opposed by most former Soviet bloc countries voted 
to end Russia’s suspension, which began with the annexation of Crimea 
from Ukraine in 2014.
Those voting to restore Russia’s full rights in the council argued that 
if Russia left the organization – as it had threatened to do – it would 
1  V. Cheterian, The August 2008 War in Georgia: From Ethnic Confl ict to Border 
Wars, “Central Asian Survey”, no. 28(2)/2009, p. 155.
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deny Russian citizens the right to bring cases before the European Court 
of Human Rights. Opponents argued that Europe was giving in to the 
illegal annexation of Crimea and Russia’s support for separatist warfare 
in eastern Ukraine – and just as importantly, was starting a process of 
normalizing relations with Moscow. The head of Ukraine’s delegation 
said the decision sent a “very bad message” to Moscow and others.2
According to several papers on this issue, incoherence in EU con-
fl ict resolution policy towards post-Soviet countries has been conse-
quent upon two causal factors: the preferences of the EU Member States 
conditioned by their historical experience with Russia, along with the 
institutional framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP).
European Union confl ict resolution instruments are categorised into 
two approaches: the Enlargement Policy, and the Neighbourhood Policy. 
For research purposes, EU confl ict resolution instruments in the frame 
of the Common Foreign and Security Policy concerning neighbouring 
countries are reviewed.
This paper will strive for a balance between existing explanations and 
also aims to explore to what extent EU has impacted on the confl ict res-
olution process of Georgia’s secessionist confl icts and whether this can 
be related to the objectives, priorities, and time perspectives of the EU’s 
confl ict resolution policies, and, in the frame of the current research, 
Georgia’s societal attitude transformation over the past 10 years will be 
revisited.
For research purposes, the theory of Offensive Realism will be applied 
to explain Russia’s invasion in Georgia in August 2008. This theory focus-
es on the actions of great powers which seek regional hegemony in order 
to achieve security, and also focuses on disinformation targeting Geor-
gia’s neighbours or partners as an instrument for the Kremlin to achieve 
its strategic goals and promote extremist groups within Georgian society. 
Concerning EU policy – the democratic peace theory and the Europeani-
zation Confl ict concept will be revisited.
An Analysis of European Union Foreign 
and Security Policy Approaches
This part of the paper will be devoted to an analysis of confl ict reso-
lution instruments in the frame of the EU’s Foreign and Security and 
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zation” concept in the framework of the democratic peace theory, and re-
viewing EU bilateral relations with other regional actors.
The EU’s foreign policy relations (FPRs) takes four main forms: en-
largement (towards the core area of Europe), stabilization (in “the neigh-
bourhood”), bilateralism (towards great and strong powers) and inter 
regionalism (towards regions and regional organizations). The four rela-
tionships are partly explained by the principle of distance which, in turn, 
leads to four types of counterparts: prospective members, neighbours, 
great powers, and more far-away regions.3
Considering the fact that in the Eastern neighbourhood, EU involve-
ment in confl ict resolution is seen as an obligation aimed at achieving 
border security, without enlargement interests, and contrary to the case 
when and if the EU may become involved in confl ict, current research 
will pay attention to stabilization and bilateral forms of the EU’s foreign 
policy relations, outlining the EU’s role in confl ict resolution in the South 
Caucasus considering Russia’s support for separatist forces.
Since the dissolution of the USSR, the South Caucasus countries of 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, all with different internal and external 
social/political dynamics, have experienced the multi-vectoral approach 
of the EU’s infl uence on their politics, economies and societies; Georgia, 
with its Western and reformist orientation, Armenia, with its pro-Russian 
hybrid regime, and Azerbaijan, with its authoritarian aspirations.
The European Union, in concert with those South Caucasus countries, 
has developed a coherent economic policy, especially in the transport sec-
tor. Its fi rst initiative was the TRACECA programme, involving the Eu-
ropean Union and 14 Member States of the Eastern European, Caucasian 
and Central Asian region established in May 1993 and, upon the signing 
of a Multilateral Agreement, the objectives of TRACECA were underlined 
by the Baku Initiative and originated from the European Neighbourhood 
Policy launched in 2004. Between 1996 and 2016, INOGATE – the Inter-
state Oil and Gas Transportation to Europe mechanism was in operation. 
Those initiatives are considered to be a support to the political and eco-
nomic independence of the former Soviet Union republics through the 
enhancing of their access to European and global markets.4
From 2003, in the framework of the EU Foreign and Security Policy, 
different civilian missions and military operations by EU rapid reaction 
forces were implemented, aimed at peacebuilding and peacekeeping in 
3  B. Hettne, F. Soderbaum, Civilian Power or Soft Imperialism? EU as a Glob-
al Actor and the Role of Inter – Regionalism, “European Foreign Affairs Review”, 
no. 10(4)/2005, p. 535.
4  http://www.traceca-org.org/en/traceca/ (access 20.04.2019).
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confl ict regions. In the framework of the CFSP, the EU practices soft 
power instruments – among them international agreement-fulfi lment 
monitoring. This instrument is valuable for this research because from 
October 2008, Geneva International Discussions (GID) and its address-
ing of the consequences of the August 2008 Russia–Georgia war remains 
the only platform for all interested sides to discuss security-related issues 
and the humanitarian needs of the confl ict-affected population.
The topic of European integration, also known as Europeanisation, 
boasts an extensive amount of literature pertaining to it. Two main theo-
retical strands can be distinguished in studies of Europeanisation: de-
scribing it as a process of accession to the EU and as the spread of Euro-
pean infl uence beyond the administrative borders of the EU. However, 
the majority of scholars perceive Europeanisation as a mixture of both. 
Furthermore, classical studies of Europeanisation distinguish two main 
strands of European integration: so called “bottom-up” and “top-down” 
approaches. The “bottom-up” Europeanisation strand conceptualises 
the process in terms of Member States’ responses to European integra-
tion and observes the phenomena as originating at the national level. 
The “top-down” approach, in contrast, emphasises the importance of the 
EU’s impact on policy-making and institution building. Of these two ap-
proaches, European integration in the South Caucasus mainly assumes 
the “top-down” form.5
The idea behind the CFSP is to secure the gains of regional integra-
tion from external threats with the goal of having a single European voice 
on external affairs. It was introduced as one of three pillars of European 
integration in the Treaty on the European Union (the Maastricht Treaty) 
and then later given a greater institutional framework in the Amsterdam 
Treaty. The Lisbon Treaty, concluded by 27 Member States of the Euro-
pean Union on the 13th of December 2007 and which has been in effect 
since 2009, set a renewed and extended agenda for the European Foreign 
and Security Policy. This progress has occurred mostly in the fi elds of Eu-
ropean diplomacy and civilian crisis management via stabilisation efforts. 
The Treaty of Lisbon created the offi ce of High Representative of the 
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and an intergovernmental 
approach of the CFSP among the Member States.
The European Union has undertaken many overseas operations, us-
ing civilian and military instruments in several countries in three con-
tinents (Europe, Africa and Asia), as part of its Common Security and 
5  H. Aliyev, Assessing the European Union’s Assistance to Civil Society in Its Eastern 
Neighbourhood: Lessons from the South Caucasus, “Journal of Contemporary European 
Studies”, no. 24(1)/2016, pp. 44–45.
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Defence Policy (CSDP). Each EU mission works within the framework 
of a comprehensive approach. A mission works in agreement and coordi-
nation with the EU Delegations in the same area and in the framework 
of EU regional policies. The decisions of deployment and management 
of a mission are taken by the EU countries during the Foreign Affairs 
Council. The European Union is implementing 6 military and 10 civilian 
missions.6
For the research purposes, the Europeanization Confl ict Concept is 
when the EU creates a framework for confl ict resolution, or participates 
in a process as its mediator.
The Democratic Peace Theory can be traced back to Kant, who sug-
gested that in constitutional republics where political leaders are account-
able to society, checks-and-balances restrain ambitions for war. Doyle has 
revived Kant’s argument and underlined that liberal democracies never 
fought each other. Accordingly, Doyle has theorised that individual liber-
ties, the rule of law, free elections, and democratic norms make democrat-
ic states develop mutual respect and peaceful relations with each other. 
The Democratic Peace Theory has received support from several stud-
ies. Maoz and Russett have examined the period between 1946–1986 and 
found that democracies are unlikely to fi ght each other. Their fi ndings 
are supported by Oneal and Ray, who reached similar conclusions when 
controlling for economic interdependence.7
European diplomacy and foreign policy were severely tested in the 
Southern Caucasus by the Georgian summer war of 2008 with Russia over 
two secessionist border provinces. France took the initiative to mediate 
and acted more in the name of the EU than with its support, let alone with 
the participation of its partners. The Georgian confl ict reactivated the 
Russian challenge to European security and cooperation as well as expos-
ing the differences of political choices in crises between EU and NATO 
Member States.8
The EU was at the forefront of international efforts to stop the fi ve-
day war in August 2008. The then head of the EU Presidency, French 
President Nicolas Sarkozy, engaged in a series of diplomatic negotia-
tions between the parties that resulted in the signature of a six-point 
6  https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/430/military-and- 
civilian-missions-and-operations_en (access 20.04.2019); https://eeas.europa.eu/top-
ics/eu-global-strategy_en?page=2 (access 20.04.2019).
7  M. Bayar, A. Kotelis, Democratic Peace or Hegemonic Stability? The Imia/Kardak 
Case, “Turkish Studies”, no. 15(2)/2014, p. 243.
8  L. Ruhl, European Foreign and Security Policy Since the Lisbon Treaty – from Com-
mon to Single? Centre for European Integration Studies, Bonn 2014, p. 14.
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Agreement, wherein points were added on the withdrawal of Russian 
peacekeeping forces, international monitoring, and consultation mech-
anisms. On October 1st 2008, the EU launched an unarmed civilian-
monitoring mission to Georgia, namely the EUMM Georgia. The mis-
sion set out to monitor the actions of the confl icting parties and ensure 
their full compliance with the six-point Agreement, to contribute to sta-
bilisation, normalisation, confi dence building and to inform EU policy 
for a political solution to the confl ict. The mission deploys around 200 
monitors patrolling the buffer zones around the confl ict-affected ter-
ritories. The mandate covers the territory of Georgia’s internationally 
recognised borders.
According to the offi cial website of the European Union Monitoring 
Mission, “Our mandate is valid throughout all of Georgia. However, the 
de facto authorities of Abkhazia and South Ossetia have so far denied us 
access to the territories under their control”.9
The EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus was appointed 
as the fi rst EUSR for the crisis in Georgia with a mandate to facilitate the 
overall implementation of the six-point Agreement. The previous posi-
tion and mandate of the EUSR for the South Caucasus, established in 
2003, was kept until September 2011 when the two mandates were merged 
into one. This new, broad mandate included contribution to a peaceful 
settlement of the confl icts in the South Caucasus, including Georgia’s 
confl icts and the Nagorno-Karabakh confl ict, as well as to encourage re-
gional cooperation.
It is fi rstly argued that the ENP, in terms of democratization, has 
failed. After a decade of EU democracy promotion toward the six post-
Communist partner states, there are few signs of democratic progress in 
the neighbouring region. Since the ENP was launched, Moldova, Geor-
gia, and Ukraine have seen very limited democratic progress, while the 
democratic record in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Belarus has reversed un-
der growing authoritarianism. Although it is possible that the democratic 
trajectory of these countries could have been even worse without the EU’s 
partnership, it is argued that the EU has failed to achieve the democratic 
objective as set out in the ENP, and that the ENP on democratization has 
had limited impact, if any. Secondly, it is also argued that the EU’s policy 
to promote security and integration through democratization has resulted 
in destabilisation in three partner states that has jeopardised European 
security. The military confl icts in Ukraine and Georgia and the political 
tension in Moldova of the 1990s and 2000 are a consequence of the EU’s 
9  https://eumm.eu/en/about_eumm/mandate (access 20.04.2019).
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push for democracy in the region and Russia’s reactions and striving for 
regional hegemonic infl uence.10
In order to evaluate EU Foreign Policy thoroughly, relations with Rus-
sia and the USA should be taken into consideration.
The EU and Russia recognise each other as key partners on the inter-
national scene and cooperate on a number of issues of mutual interest.11
There are major differences between the EU and the USA as regards 
external relations. One is the EU’s preference for long-term multidimen-
sional, horizontal, institutional arrangements, whereas the USA prefers 
more temporary coalitions of the willing under its own leadership. A sec-
ond difference can be related to contrasting ideas (idealism versus real-
ism) in political philosophy. A third dimension of this European-Amer-
ican contrast in political culture is the US’ religious approach to foreign 
policy, whereas the European approach is supposed to be rationalist and 
secular. The relations between the EU and Russia are rather similar to 
those between the EU and the USA in the sense that Russia also prefers 
bilateralism and takes a realist approach in foreign affairs. The EU has 
nevertheless a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with Rus-
sia (signed in 1997) which covers human rights, economy, trade, security, 
and justice issues. The idea of a strategic partnership between the EU and 
Russia (where EU membership is a non-issue) implies substantive geopo-
litical room for manoeuvre for the latter.12
Territorial Confl icts in the South Caucasus, 
August 2008 Georgia–Russia War
The South Caucasus is the site of three armed confl icts with separa-
tist backgrounds which have remained unsolved for years: the confl icts 
in Georgia’s Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and Azerbaijan’s confl ict over 
Nagorno-Karabakh. Both states are simultaneously in confl ict with the 
separatists’ informal patrons, respectively Russia and Armenia. The con-
fl icts in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh broke out in 
the 1980s and 1990s in connection with the ongoing dissolution of the 
10  M. Nilson, D. Silander, Democracy and Security in the EU’s Eastern Neighbor-
hood? Assessing the ENP in Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine, “Democracy and Security”, 
no. 12(1)/2016, p. 45.
11  https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/35939/european-
union-and-russian-federation_en (access 27.06.2019).
12  B. Hettne, F. Soderbaum, Civilian Power or Soft Imperialism? EU as a Glob-
al Actor and the Role of Inter – Regionalism, “European Foreign Affairs Review”, 
no. 10(4)/2005, p. 535.
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USSR. They stemmed from deeply-rooted ethnic confl icts (Georgian-
Abkhazian, Georgian-Ossetian, and Azeri-Armenian) and the rise of na-
tionalistic sentiment and independence aspirations in Georgia and Az-
erbaijan on the wave of perestroika. With the crucial assistance of Russia, 
(offered through Armenia in the case of Nagorno-Karabakh), separatists 
took control over the disputed areas in the course of armed operations 
and managed to defend their independence from Georgia and Azerbaijan. 
They created para-state organisms which were unrecognised by the inter-
national community in the areas they controlled, and which have become 
de facto protectorates of Russia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia) and Arme-
nia (Nagorno-Karabakh). The ‘hot phase’ of the confl icts ended in the 
mid-1990s, with ceasefi res dictated by Russia and concluded under the 
auspices of the UN (Abkhazia) and the OSCE (South Ossetia, Nagorno-
Karabakh – the so-called OSCE Minsk Group). The next phase was ne-
gotiations, involving the patrons of peace and the parties to the confl icts, 
which continued for nearly a decade but failed to further the resolution 
of the confl icts.13
Over the years there was a gradual increase in European involvement 
in Georgia, which may be called forthcoming in terms of economic aid, 
politically friendly on the bilateral side, cooperative but cautious on con-
tentious political issues and… mostly distanced [from] sensitive security 
issues. A good case in point was the European reluctance to take over the 
Border Monitoring Mission on the Caucasus range facing Russia, after 
Russia had vetoed the hitherto OSCE engagement in 2004.14
Since 2003, the EU has deployed an increasing number of instruments 
to promote confl ict settlement in the South Caucasus. It appointed a spe-
cial envoy to the region, tried to join the Russia-led confl ict- settlement 
formats in South Ossetia as an observer, and fi nanced the rehabilitation 
of the confl icts zones around Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Over the years, 
the EU spent over EUR 30 million before 2008 on post-confl ict recon-
struction around the confl ict zones of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.15
However, the EU has been quite divided on its potential engagement 
in the South Caucasus. Some EU states feared that a greater EU role in 
the South Caucasus would complicate EU-Russia relations and wanted 
13  W. Bartuzi, et al. Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh: Unfrozen Confl icts 
Between Russia and the West, “OSW Special Report” 2008, pp. 1–3.
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to avoid that at nearly any cost. Russia clearly opposed a greater EU role 
in confl ict resolution. This internal and external opposition to greater 
EU involvement in confl ict resolution in Georgia resulted in a number of 
policy failures by the EU. In late 2004, Russia vetoed the extension of the 
mandate of the 150-strong OSCE border monitoring mission in Georgia. 
Tbilisi invited the EU to take over the international monitoring of the 
Georgia-Russian border. Back in 2005, France (which later led the peace-
keeping effort in 2008) led the ‘Nyet’ camp with the diplomatic support 
of Spain, Italy, Greece, and Germany to a degree against EU involvement 
in the messy Caucasian affairs. As a result, instead of the requested 150 
monitors, the EU only sent 3 persons as part of a so-called EU Special 
Representative’s Border Support Team. The team-member count was lat-
er increased to 12 persons. The EU’s failure to deploy confl ict-prevention 
mechanisms in Georgia and engage in confl ict settlement was clearly the 
most signifi cant. Throughout 2007–2008, the EU also tried to beef up the 
team with two police and two border liaison offi cers who were supposed 
to develop an institutionalised dialogue with Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
on police and border management related issues. Internal foot-dragging 
by some EU Member States, concerned that this would irritate Russia 
(especially Greece), and subsequently the August 2008 war, disrupted the 
process of extending the EU border support team.16
On 8th August 2008, Russian troops, for the fi rst time since 1979, 
crossed national borders to attack a sovereign state, which resulted in 
the greatest crisis for European security in over a decade. The fi ve- day 
war between Russia and Georgia caused the death of hundreds of soldiers 
and civilians, saw thousands wounded, caused the displacement of over 
100,000 people, and witnessed the de facto loss of the Georgian breakaway 
regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
The August 2008 confl ict in Georgia was the shortest of the six wars 
that have broken out in the Caucasus in the past 20 years since the dissolu-
tion of the Soviet Union. With some 850 victims, it incurred fewer casual-
ties than the other confl icts in the region. However, this war still seriously 
challenged relations between Russia and the West, and especially between 
Russia and the European Union. The principle of the inviolability of inter-
national borders, as established in the Helsinki Final Act, was disregarded. 
Also violated were the basic rules of international law, such as the respect 
for sovereignty and territorial integrity, along with key principles from the 
Charter of the United Nations such as the non-use or threat of force.17
16  Ibidem.
17  H. Tagliavini, The August 2008 Confl ict in Georgia, “Proceedings of the Annual 
Meeting American Society of International Law”, no. 105/2011, p. 89.
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Before the August 2008 war, the Region of Tskhinvali was under the de 
facto control of separatists; this region was populated both by Georgians 
and Ossetians. Villages were mixed in a chessboard order that actually 
favoured the Georgian side, and were under the offi cial control of the 
Georgian government in Tbilisi. Tensions rose gradually beginning in 
late July 2008, when all sides of the confl ict (including the press) were 
spreading the word that the situation within the confl ict territories was 
worsening. On July 28th of the same year, separatist fi ghters opened fi re 
on OSCE observers and peacekeepers, as those fi ghters were moving in 
the direction of the village of Chorbauli; on July 29th, prior to the offi cial 
outbreak of hostilities, the separatist militants initiated the shelling of 
villages inhabited by mixed ethnic populations.18
The bombardment rounds used were illegal under international law, 
because of their large calibre. That same day, the OSCE observers work-
ing together with peacekeepers were fi red upon again. Similar incidents, 
reported by the OSCE mission in Georgia, took place until August 6th, 
including continuous minor armed clashes, the shelling of villages, artil-
lery bombardments, and numerous responses to “hostile fi re” reported 
by both sides. On August 4th-5th, Tskhinvali was visited by journalists 
and diplomats, and on August 7th by Temur Yakobashvili, the Georgian 
Minister of Reintegration, along with Yuri Popov, chief Russian negotiator 
over South Ossetia. While the Georgian minister’s attempt to start a ne-
gotiation process failed because of the Ossetian refusal to participate, Mr. 
Popov was more successful. He managed to contact the de facto ruler of the 
region, Eduard Kokoiti, but failed to convince him to attend a meeting. In 
a short time, General Marat Kulakhmetov, Commander of the Joint Peace-
keeping Forces in the Tskhinvali region, admitted that his peacekeepers 
could not stop Ossetian combatants from shelling the villages, and advised 
the Georgian side to declare a unilateral cease fi re, which was announced 
by Mr. Saakashvili at 7:10pm. The peace did not last long. According to 
offi cial reports from Tbilisi, troops of the Russian Federation had already 
entered the region at that time through the Roki Tunnel. The tunnel is 
approximately 3600 meters long, and is one of very few routes connect-
ing Georgia and the Russian Federation. Bombardment of the Georgian 
villages resumed from 8:30pm, and at around 11:35pm, the President of 
Georgia transmitted three orders to the Commander of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff: to halt the invasion of the Georgian territory by the regular army of 
the Russian Federation; to suppress enemy fi re directed against the Geor-
gian villages through the elimination of the weapon emplacements of the 
18  http://www.parliament.ge/fi les/1329_22127_506571_Conclusion_E.pdf (access 
20.04.2019).
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adversary in the Tskhinvali region and, fi nally, to ensure the security of the 
peaceful civilian population of the Tskhinvali region. On the other side, 
the Russian President gave similar orders to his military command. The 
Russian operation, dubbed “Compulsion to Peace,” implied the use of all 
means necessary to protect the South Ossetian population from Georgian 
“aggression” and prevent such attacks in the future. As a result, Georgian 
armed forces were forced out of the region, and more than half of the coun-
try was occupied by Russian troops.
On August 15th, with the active mediation of the French President 
Nicolas Sarkozy, Presidents Saakashvili and Medvedev signed a ceasefi re 
agreement, containing the following six points: (1) Adopt the regime of 
the non-use of force, (2) Halt all military activities, (3) Ensure free access 
to humanitarian aid in the region, (4) Return Georgian troops to their 
regular dispositions, (5) Return Russian troops to the lines held prior to 
the ongoing military activity while empowering Russian peacekeepers 
with the provision of additional security measures until an international 
solution is attained, and (6) Start international discussions on the pres-
ervation of security and stability in both the South Ossetia and Abkhazia 
regions.19
The occupied territories give Russia major political leverage over 
Georgia. Russian bases in the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia pose 
serious problem in terms of the population’s security. One base is a mere 
20 km away from Tbilisi, in the Akhalgori region. The military units 
from this base provide major support to the illegal separatist authorities 
in the regions. Provocations continue periodically, such as the so-called 
‘borderisation’, abductions of local people by the Russian troops, etc.20
The collapse of the Soviet Union triggered the rise of a new politi-
cal paradigm in the South Caucasus. In turn, ethnic confl icts and the 
emergence of de facto states determined the foreign policies and strate-
gic objectives of regional actors and global powers as they dealt with the 
post-Soviet space.21
In this context, Russia has continuously sought to position itself as 
the sole successor to the Soviet Union’s geopolitical heritage. This as-
19  G. Pochkhua, A Game Theory Application of the Rational Actor Model to the Rus-
so-Georgian War of August 2008, “Connections”, no. 10(1)/2010, pp. 89–90.
20  http://prismua.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/DRI_CEE_2018.pdf (access 
15.04.2019).
21  E.A. Souleimanov, E. Abrahamyan, H. Aliyev, Unrecognised states as a means 
of coercive diplomacy? Assessing the role of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Russia’s for-
eign policy in the South Caucasus, “Southeast European and Black Sea Studies”, 
no. 18(1)/2017, p. 77.
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sumption actually predetermined Moscow’s political assertiveness and 
its consistently defi ant posture in its efforts to radically reverse the post-
cold-war order. The fundamental shift in Russia’s foreign policy, which 
started gradually in the mid-2000s, became more evident during the 2008 
Russian-Georgian war and was fully unveiled by the seizure of Crimea 
in 2014. However, the phenomenon termed in the scholarly literature as 
“Russian revisionism”, has been more variable and more nuanced than 
this commonplace conclusion suggests. Since Russia remains opposed 
to a formal revision of borders outside of the Post-Soviet space, Russian 
revisionism has to be understood as being targeted and selective in its 
nature.22
The theory of offensive realism adequately explains Russia’s policy 
towards the South Caucasus. According to this theory, security in the in-
ternational system is scarce, driven by the anarchical nature of the inter-
national system, and such theorists contend that states seek to maximize 
their security through maximizing their relative power by expansionist 
foreign policies, taking advantage of opportunities to gain more power, 
and weakening potential challengers. The state’s ultimate goal is hegem-
ony or primacy. How a state will go about such expansion will vary from 
nation to nation (due to geography, military tradition, etc.). Offensive re-
alism does not predict the same security strategy for every state.23
Civil Position and 2019’s Anti-government Protest 
in Georgia – “Gavrilov’s Night”
In June of 2019, member of the Russian Communist Party and legisla-
tive body Duma Sergey Gavrilov visited Georgia within the Inter-parlia-
mentary Assembly on Orthodoxy and occupied the chair of the speaker 
of Parliament of Georgia reserved by protocol for the Head of Parliament. 
He delivered a speech in Russian extolling the Orthodox brotherhood of 
Georgia and Russia. Earlier that week, Gavrilov had voted in favour of 
the independence of Abkhazia, an act that angered the Ukrainian ambas-
sador to Georgia. Following Gavrilov’s actions, the Georgian opposition 
blocked the speaker and called for protests that demanded the govern-
ment’s resignation. As night fell, Georgian law enforcement used tear gas 
and rubber bullets to disperse protesters. Approximately 240 demonstra-
tors were injured while clashing with police and 305 protesters were ar-
rested. At least two people sustained eye injuries and experienced loss of 
22  Ibidem.
23  S.E. Lobell, War is Politics: Offensive Realism, Domestic Politics, and Security 
Strategies, “Security Studies”, no. 12(2)/2002, pp. 165–166.
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vision due to rubber bullets. The government accused the protesters of at-
tempting to storm the parliament building. Following the protests of June 
20th–21st 2019, Irakli Kobakhidze, Georgia’s Chairman of Parliament, an-
nounced his resignation. After mass demonstrations on June 24th in Tbi-
lisi, the head of the ruling Georgian Dream Party, Bidzina Ivanishvili, 
announced a change to the electoral system from a mixed to proportional 
representation for the 2020 elections and a lowering of the vote barrier 
for parties, and President Salome Zurabishvili shortened her visit to Be-
larus following the beginning of the protests. In an interview with Eu-
ronews, Zurabishvili called for a “de-escalation” in the situation while 
also blaming Russia for stirring up a “fi fth column” in a country that is 
loyal to Moscow. In July 2019, Russia denounced an expletive-laden attack 
on Vladimir Putin by Georgian TV host Giorgi Gabunia during a broad-
cast on Rustavi 2, although Minister of Internal Affairs Giorgi Gakharia, 
who said he took political responsibility for the June 20th developments 
as minister, but would remain in his position until an investigation clari-
fi ed who was liable for what transpired.24
As for the conclusion, Gavrilov’s statement sparked massive protests 
that led to police action, apologies from the government, resignations of 
political leaders and the adoption of electoral reforms ahead of the 2020 
elections. At the same time, Nika Melia MP, from the opposing political 
party United National Movement was released on bail, as he had been 
charged with organising, managing or participating in group violence 
during the protests.
After June 2019’s civil protest, Russian president Vladimir Putin signed 
a decree suspending passenger fl ights carrying Russian citizens from Rus-
sia to Georgia, effective as of July 8th, and Russia’s Federal Service for 
Surveillance on Consumer Rights Protection and Human Well-being in-
creased quality controls on Georgian wine and mineral water, seen as be-
ing directly linked to the escalation in tensions.
The then acting government of Georgia attempted to link the country’s 
existing economic problems to the civil protest and convince its citizens 
that anti-occupation rallies diminished the number of Russian tourists, 
which subsequently infl icted the country’s economic system, thereby sub-
sidising fl ights from Russia to Georgia while at the same time oppressed 
independent media outlet Rustavi 2, which had obtained materials on the 
excessive use of force by police offi cers during the civil protest.25
24  https://agenda.ge/en/news/2019/1734 (access 27.06.2019).
25  Georgia has a broad and diversifi ed media landscape and the most liberal me-
dia laws in the entire Southern Caucasus region. There is virtually no direct state 
censorship, although in some cases, private media refl ect the political orientation of 
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Following the 2012 parliamentary elections in Georgia, a new political 
force came to power that actually started to “reset” relations between the 
Kremlin and Tbilisi. This new political entity brought a partial restora-
tion of economic relations and trade between the two countries. Accord-
ing to data from 2017, Russia is Georgia’s largest export destination, with 
14.1% (274 million USD) of Georgian products exported to the country 
compared to 2016 when Russia came in third (132 million USD) after 
Turkey and China. Despite an increase in export to Russia, the largest 
share (24%) of Georgian export goes to EU countries. Russia comes in 
second as the largest importer of Georgian goods, following Turkey (532 
million USD). Most imports come from the EU (28%).26
Those members of the Georgian population aged 50 and older have 
spent a signifi cant part of their lives in the Soviet era; they speak Rus-
sian, have person-to-person contact within Russian society and many feel 
nostalgic about the Soviet past. Another group vulnerable to pro-Kremlin 
propaganda in Georgia is made up of ethnic minorities (namely the Ar-
menians and Azerbaijanis). A lack of knowledge of the Georgian language 
among the Armenian and Azerbaijani populations, living in the southern 
and south-eastern parts of the country, is a serious barrier to their inte-
gration into Georgian society. As a result, it is diffi cult to keep this popu-
lation informed through Georgian sources and leaves space for foreign 
disinformation sources including, of course, those Kremlin-governed. 
It should be noted that after the 2008 war, Georgian cable TV compa-
nies stopped transmitting Russian channels upon a verbal directive from 
the government. All Russian channels were also removed from cable TV 
packages. However, after the change of government in 2012, the broad-
casting of Russian channels resumed. For these reasons, ethnic minorities 
as well as the Russian, Armenian, Azerbaijani, and Kurdish populations 
prefer watching programmes where the language is familiar and the con-
tent more interesting which naturally works against Georgia’s efforts to 
counter disinformation. The large Georgian diaspora and their economic 
(among other) links with their families in Georgia provide the Kremlin 
with a favourable means of provocation in terms of disinformation and 
media company owners, on whom they depend both fi nancially and politically. Over 
the past few years, some news websites have been actively involved in anti-Western 
propaganda and their rhetoric is often expressed in a xenophobic and homophobic 
context.
26  http://www.economy.ge/?page=ecoreview&s=20&lang=en (access 27.06.2019); 
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as a means of exerting other kinds of infl uence. We may also consider the 
conservative portion of active believers belonging to the Georgian Ortho-
dox Church as being vulnerable to Kremlin disinformation.27
The ambiguous policy of the Georgian authorities towards Russia, the 
post-Soviet past of some of Georgia’s citizens, the ethnic minorities in 
the southern part of Georgia, and a common religion with Russia all rep-
resent a serious threat to Georgia’s political orientation. At this stage of 
development, it is most important to strengthen the EU’s political instru-
ments in Georgia, as well to ensure EU border security and avoid Russia’s 
hegemony in the South Caucasus region.28
Conclusions
The aim of this paper was to provide an empirical analysis of EU poli-
cy towards the South Caucasus in the framework of the CFSP and CSDP 
and, especially, to provide a case study of August 2008’s Georgia-Russia 
military confrontation, testing several assumptions, and also to revisit 
Russian propaganda role in public attitudes formation in post-Soviet so-
cieties. A summarizing task will reconnect the theoretical conclusions 
and generalise fi ndings.
Several authors admit that the EU’s Kantian view of security through 
democracy has failed, and its ambition to create a ring of Eastern friends 
has not led to improved relations in the Eastern neighbourhood. Indeed, 
it is rather to the contrary; the EU’s push eastward has instead intensifi ed 
insecurity in its partner states due to limited democratization.29
The breakout of the war demonstrated the inadequacy of EU confl ict 
prevention and management policies in the region. Despite signifi cant 
funding disbursed to mitigate the consequences of the confl icts, EU as-
sistance was not able to install better, more effective political and security 
strategies for confl ict prevention.30
Additionally, a number of authors admit that the EU’s efforts have 
signifi cantly contributed to the objective of confl ict prevention, but the 
profi le of the EU in the fi eld of international confl ict management weak-
ened its position in the area of confl ict transformation, where the lack 
27  http://prismua.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/DRI_CEE_2018.pdf (access 
27.06.2019).
28  Authors Observation.
29  M. Nilson, D. Silander, Democracy and Security in the EU’s Eastern Neighbor-
hood? Assessing the ENP in Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine, “Democracy and Security”, 
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of progress in turn limited the EU’s impact in the areas of international 
confl ict management and confl ict settlement. The main conclusion put 
forward is that in order to have a true impact, the EU needs to undertake 
a differentiated, balanced and patient approach to confl ict resolution.31
The mentality of the Soviet Union system cultivated in the Cold 
War period offers good grounds to stir up anti-Western sentiment and 
to strengthen loyal attitudes towards Russia as the legal successor of the 
USSR and an opponent of the West.32
Although Russia’s interests in the South Caucasus have been certainly 
economic, signifi cant security interests have also been at stake. The indig-
enous population in the North Caucasus is closely linked, both culturally 
and ethnically, to some ethnic groups in the South Caucasus. The 1991–
1992 South Ossetian confl ict had, for example, dramatic repercussions in 
the republic of North Ossetia within the Russian Federation; hundreds of 
North Ossetian volunteers fought against Georgian troops and donations 
were collected for the ‘South Ossetian brethren’. In addition, the Abkhaz-
ian confl ict during 1992–1993 generated tension in the ethnically related 
North Caucasian republic of Adyghe. Furthermore, the South Caucasus 
occupies a strategically important position as a land bridge linking Rus-
sia with Turkey and the countries of the Middle East. Therefore, Russia’s 
security has been tied to the South Caucasus.33
In order to retain the South Caucasus in its orbit, Moscow considered 
it both affordable and reasonable to utilise the existing states in Abk-
hazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno Karabakh as instruments in order 
to regulate and limit the dynamic of integration by Georgia, Armenia, 
and Azerbaijan into Western institutions. To that end, Russia elaborated 
and imposed a range of instruments and mechanisms which facilitated 
the use of the unrecognised states as means of coercive diplomacy vis-
a-vis Tbilisi, Baku and Yerevan. As a consequence, Russia’s geopolitical 
ambitions to some extent continue to determine the destiny of the de 
facto states.34
31  E. Jeppsson, A Differentiated, Balanced and Patient Approach? The EU’s Involve-
ment with Georgia’s Secessionist Confl icts beyond the August 2008 War, “EU Diplomacy 
Paper”, no. 06/2015, p. 7.
32  http://prismua.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/DRI_CEE_2018.pdf (access 
15.04.2019).
33  E. Karagiannis, The 2008 Russian-Georgian War Via the Lens of Offensive Real-
ism, “European Security”, no. 22(1)/2013, p. 83.
34  E.A. Souleimanov, E. Abrahamyan, H. Aliyev, Unrecognized states as a means 
of coercive diplomacy? Assessing the role of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Russia’s for-
eign policy in the South Caucasus, “Southeast European and Black Sea Studies”, 
no. 18(1)/2017, p. 78.
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It may be assumed that Russian military intervention in South Ossetia 
was a predictable reaction to possible NATO expansion into Georgia, con-
sidering a Bucharest April 2008 Summit, wherein Georgia and Ukraine had 
hoped to join the NATO Membership Action Plan, but NATO members 
only decided to review their request in December 2008.
As for the conclusion, the EU paid twice. After avoiding the deploy-
ment of 150 monitors in Georgia in 2005 in order not to irritate Russia, the 
EU ended up deploying close to 300 monitors in 2008 and paying close to 
EUR 1 billion to the international fund for a post-confl ict rehabilitation 
of Georgia. The war of 2008 culminated in being one of the worst crises in 
EU-Russia relations since the end of the Cold War.
In the empirical part of the paper, it has become clear that, despite 
long-term ENP democracy promotion, there has been very limited 
democratic development in the partner states and security challenges 
remain unsolved. As far as the conducting of civilian missions in coun-
tries where the EU does not have any enlargement interests (and where 
confl ict resolution instruments are not backed by political strategy) is 
concerned, this approach may lead to confl ict resolution if confl ict were 
to occur through economic problems. However, when confl ict is political 
in its nature, intervention without political instruments does not lead 
to confl ict resolution. The absence of any political strategy tied with the 
Kremlin’s disinformation campaign affect the European aspirations of 
Georgian society.
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